Security policy

This repository contains a working participatory-surveillance stack for One Health observations in Arizona. Bugs that affect the confidentiality of observations, the integrity of cluster-detection signals, or the availability of agency-side dashboards during an active outbreak are treated as security incidents — not just functional bugs.

Reporting a vulnerability

Placeholder private channel — to be replaced at community handoff. The maintaining team will publish a real private disclosure address (a security@ mailbox and/or a GitHub Security Advisory private-disclosure link) as part of the v1.0 handoff. Until then, please use the temporary channel below.

Temporary disclosure address (handoff placeholder): epihack-security@arizona.edu (placeholder — confirm with the maintainer before sending sensitive material).

When reporting, please include:

Do not open a public GitHub issue for security reports. Please allow up to 10 business days for an initial response and 90 days for a coordinated fix before public disclosure. The standing review board (see GOVERNANCE.md) is looped in on any report that touches tribal data; ITCA-TEC is notified directly on those.

Scope

In scope:

Out of scope:

Threat model

These are the five threat classes the repo is designed against, with the mitigations already in place and the gaps that remain.

1. Re-identification of suppressed observations

Threat. An analyst or external party with access to a dashboard or aggregated feed reverse-engineers individual line data — most acutely for observations on tribal land or for low-incidence pathogens (hantavirus, plague) where a single cell can identify a household.

Mitigations in place.

2. MCP-server credential leakage

Threat. An API key, agency token, or OAuth refresh credential for VectorSurv / Twilio / a private agency endpoint is leaked via a log, an agent_run row, a stack trace, a public bug report, or a committed .env.

Mitigations in place.

3. Malicious agency-token reuse

Threat. A legitimate agency-side credential is reused outside its intended scope — for example, an ADHS token used to write into a tribal-jurisdiction observation, or a CHW field-app token used to read data outside that CHW’s caseload.

Mitigations in place.

4. Prompt-injection of agency-side dashboards

Threat. A user-controlled field on an observation (free-text symptom note, species hint, address) contains LLM prompt-injection content that, when summarised on an agency dashboard or by the Triage Agent, causes the LLM to disclose data, change its triage class, or call a different MCP tool.

Mitigations in place.

5. Cluster-detection false positives causing reactive over-response

Threat. A miscalibrated detector fires on noise, triggering an emergency response (cooling-center surge dispatch, mosquito-control intervention, public alert) that disrupts services without medical justification — and erodes agency trust in the system.

Mitigations in place.

Known security gaps

We document gaps because hiding them does not make them go away. If you can close any of these, please open a PR.

Disclosure timeline

  1. T+0: report received.
  2. T+10 business days: initial acknowledgement, severity assessment, scope decision (in-scope / out-of-scope).
  3. T+30 days: patch in draft PR or workaround documented.
  4. T+90 days: coordinated public disclosure (GitHub Security Advisory + a CHANGELOG.md entry).

We will credit reporters in the advisory and the changelog unless asked otherwise.